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TAXHARMONIZATIONAND TAXCOMPETITIONIN EUROPE
Opening Europe's borders in 1993 makes the allocation of resources more vulnerable to
differences in the national tax rates. The first part of the paper demonstrates that direct
consumer purchases will imply distortions resulting from diverging VAT rates and it
clarifies why the frequently cited exchange rate argument is of no help. The second part
shows that, in the case of direct taxation, a harmonization of tax bases is more important
than a harmonization of tax rates. Either the combination of true economic depreciation
and residence taxation or the combination of immediate write—off and source taxation will
result in an efficient international allocation of capital, independent of the national tax
rates. The paper concludes with a verdict on tax competition arguing that free migration
renders a policy of income redistribution, which is interpreted as insurance against the risk






West GermanyI. When the Barriers Fall
On new year's day 1993 a period of accelerated European integration will begin.The physical
border controls will be eliminated and the last political obstacles to free migration of capitaland
labor will be removed. The liberalization is expected to improve the allocationof resources
significantly and to boost the European economy. The famous Cecchini report prophesiesthat the
improved allocation of resources will increase the level of European GDPeach year by 4—6%
beyond what it otherwise would have been.1
The removal of trade barriers will not, however, be free from problems. It may exacerbate
existing distortions resulting from non—harmonized tax systems and may evencreate new
distortions. Capital flight into low—tax countries and changes in patterns of internationaltrade
caused by differing value added tax (VAT) rates are among the consequences that may occur.To
avoid such consequences, fiscal harmonization must follow the fall of the barriers. It maybe
preferable to allocate Europe's scarce resources according to the principleof comparative economic
advantage rather than the principle of tax minimization.
Tax harmonization does not necessarily require centrally coordinated actions by the
European governments. The competition of tax systems might also, via a processof iterative
adjustment, bring about the required harmonization. For many economists,Tiebout's idea of
voting with one's feet is the preferred solution to the harmonization problem.
This paper considers some of the fundamental issues involved. It investigates the cost of
non—harmonization and tries to identify those aspects of the tax systems where the effects of a
lack of harmonization will be greatest. In its final section it also comments on the attractivenessof
a Europe that has settled to a Tiebout equilibrium.
II. Two Devices for Tax Neutrality
Economic reactions to differences between Europe's fiscal systems include commodity trade,
capital movements, labor migration, and the location decisions of firms. This paper placesmost
emphasis on the first two items since they are clearly the most important ones in termsof
sensitivity to tax differentials.
'See Cecchini (1988).2
In response to the high tax sensitivity, two protective devices have been developed io the
past to prevent international commodity and capital flows from being governed by tax
considerations. The need for harmonization can only meaningfully be studied when these
protective devices are taken into account.
The first device is the destination principle for indirect taxes. According to this principle,
commodity exports are exempt from the exporting country's tax and are instead subjected to the
tax of the country of import. The principle underlies the GATT and is used by most countries in
the world. It also applies to the European VAT where it is currently implemented by a system of
border tax adjustments. The destination principle ensures that firms compete on the basis of
"producer" prices; i.e., of prices net of the taxes. Despite international tax rate differences, there is
a tendency to equate the producer price ratios of any two commodities in all the countries that
participate in the market. Under competitive conditions this implies that the sectoral structures of
the national economies satisfy the requirement of an efficient international specialization. Given
the respective national factor endowments, no other pattern of sectoral structures would yield
higher levels of aggregate outputs.2
The second protection device is the residence principle for border crossing interest income
flows. This principle says that interest income is not taxed in the country where it is earned, but
in and by the lender's country of residence. It was recommended by the OECD Model Double
Taxation Convention of 1977 and is, in theory, applied by most OECD countries, including the
countries of the European Community. The residence principle makes investors indifferent
between domestic and foreign assets when the gross or pre—tax interest rates are the same. Despite
international differences in income tax rates, it ensures under ideal conditions that market forces
equate gross interest rates and allocate the avallahle stock of capital efficiently to the different
countries. Given this stock, no other allocation of capital would yield higher levels of aggregate
outputs.3
2For a pioneering discussion of the two principles, that time only called "System a" and "System
b", see Tinbergen Committee (1953). Further discussion of the basic issues involved can be found,
e.g., in Schulte (1966), MOller (1968), Andel (1971/72) or, to choose a more recent publication,
Cnossen and Shoup (1987).
3For an economic discussion of the residence and source principles see Sinn (1984, pp. 225—227;
1987, ch. 7).3
The residence and destination principles complement each other well. Ideally, they enable
the European countries to live with a large variety of direct and indirect tax rates without having
to fear tax—induced distortions. However, there are a number of difficulties which have to be
overcome before an approximation to this ideal result can be expected in Europe. The next few
sections will comment on some of them.
Ill. Why the Clearing Rouse Approach is Incompatible with the Destination Principle
An urgent European problem is that the current border adjustment system of the VAT can no
longer be used after the removal of border controls. To preserve the destination principle without
border controls the European Commission adopted the so—called clearing house approach.4 The
basic idea of this approach is simply to extend the invoice method which is currently applied
within the countries of the European Community to cross—border sales. For example, a German
firm buying a French product will reclaim the French VAT contained in the price from the
German revenue office and pay the German VAT on its sales instead. Since the importing rather
than the exporting country gives a credit for the prepaid VAT, a clearing mechanism is necessary
to redistribute the tax revenues between the jurisdictions involved.5 Ideally, the clearing house
approach will continue to equate the producer prices across countries and to protect the
international division of labor from being distorted by tax rate differences.
The problem with the new solution is that it rests on the assumption that all trade occurs
between firms. This assumption is neither realistic nor does it fit the Commission's declared goal
of allowing unrestricted consumer purchases in all countries of the community. Unless the VAT
rates are sufficiently harmonized, massive waves of cross border purchases in low tax countries
must be reckoned with.
The purchases will not neccesarily take the form of shopping trips or make use of existing
4See the "White Paper", EC (1985, sec. 3), and COM (87), 323. From the viewpoint of private
market agents, the system is basically Biehi's (1969) "Gemeinsamer Markt Prinzip". An
alternative would be the deferred payment approach that is currently used by the Benelux
countries. See Cnossen (1981, 1983).
It has been argued against this approach that it provides incentives for the countries to
underestimate their exports and overestimate their imports. To overcome these and other related
problems, the European Commission recently suggested that data provided by the revenue offices
should not be relied on exclusively, but that existing foreign trade statistics should also be used.
See Lee, Pearson, and Smith (1988, p. 22—23).4
types of mail order firms. Little imagination is neccesary to visualise the growth of new types of
firm that inform the consumers about foreign products and offer transportation services without
being formally categorized as sellers. As Boiteux (1988) puts it, we will see "on nouveau métier,
celui d'importateur—transporteur, par opposition I l'importateur—revendeur". It can also be
imagined that consumers will make extensive use of all the new fast communication media —
telephone,telefax, BTX, and the like —tocommunicate directly with any firm in a low-tax
country and to buy wherever the best bargains are.
The Commission has thought about mail order firms, car sales, and a few other aspects of
the problem. However, the solutions it can offer are clearly not suited to coping with the
dimensions of the problem6. In order to really exclude the household sector from international
trade, extensive controls and regulations would be neccesary compared to which current border
controls seem attractively cheap solutions. The idea of a Europe without frontiers would be made
ridiculous.
With direct consumer purchases, the destination principle becomes ineffective, and
elements of the origin principle apply. Under the origin principle, indirect taxes are producer
rather than consumer taxes and there is a tendency to equate gross, rather than net, commodity
prices.
The only way to limit cross border purchases and to ensure that net of tax prices continue
to be equated across borders seems to be a harmonization of tax rates. When the rates lie in a
band sufficiently narrow to make gains from tax arbitrage lower than transportation and
transactions costs, the origin and destination principles will roughly coincide and the incentives
for direct consumer purchases should disappear. The Commission suggested7 reducing the band for
normal consumption goods from the current 13 percentage points to 5. It thereby accepted the
view that the clearing house approach is unable to maintain the destination principle and
implicity admitted that Europe without frontiers would be a Europe where the origin principle
applies —alate, but strong confirmation of the views which the Neumark Committee (1963) had
expressed more than 25 years ago.
COM (89) 260.
TSee COM (87) 321 and 324.5
The resistance to harmonization is stronger though than the Commission anticipated.
Countries like Denmark and Ireland are rightly afraid of serious revenue losses, and low—tax
countries like Germany expect strong political opposition to tax increases. In view of these
difficulties the Commission has recently replaced its recommendation of a 5 percent band by
simple recommendations of minimum tax rates.8 However, even these have not generally met with
approval. The effects of non—harmonized tax rates under the origin principle therefore may
become relevant for Europe.
W. The Fallacy of the Exchange Rate Argument
Contrary to first appearances, the probable switch to the origin principle does not necessarily
imply that the allocative virtues of the destination principle must be sacrificed. After all, the
economic allocation of resources depends on relative rather than absolute prices. Whatever the
national levels of tax rates, as long as the rates are uniform within the countries, the domestic
gross and net price ratios of any two commodities are identical. It therefore should not make a
difference for the real allocation of resources whether competition equates gross or net prices
across the countries- In a monetary economy, price level or exchange rate adjustments alone would
be sufficient to compensate for the switch from the destination to the origin prsnciple.
This popular observation, known as the exchange rate argument, was first made by the
Tinbergen Committee (1953). Although the Committee referred to an unspecified indirect tax, the
exchange rate argument has often been explicitly applied to the European VAT, and it has even
been used to dispel the fears that the planned elimination of border controls will induce tax
distortions. Unfortunately, however, there is little reason to be optimistic. Even an ideal VAT of
the European type —onethat does not impose a higher burden on luxury goods and allows no
exceptions in the case of food, children's clothing, and the like —wouldbe non—neutral under the
origin principle.
The reason for non—neutrality is that the European VAT is a consumption tax and
8See COM (89) 260.
Cf., e.g., Whalley (1979), Berglas (1981).exempts investment goods.'° With a zero tax rate on investment goods, the gross and net price
ratios between consumption and investment goods are not identical. It therefore does make a
difference whether the destination or the origin principle applies.
To identify the distortion, consider a simple model of pure exchange with two countries,
France (F) and Germany (G), where both countries produce a homogenous consumption good (C)
and a homogenous investment good (I). Let Pg and P be the country—specific producer prices of
consumption goods, P and P the corresponding producer prices of investment goods and r and
the respective VAT rates, where TF>isa realistic assumption. Free trade in investment
goods implies an equilibrium where
(1) P=P
and, with the destination principle, trade in consumption goods implies
(2) P =P (destination principle)
or
(3) (destination principle).
On the other hand, under the origin principle (i.e. with direct consumer purchases)
(4) g(1+r0) =P(1 +r) (origin principle).
Together with the assumption rp >t, (1)and (4) imply that
(5) (origin pr., invoice method).
A comparison of (3) and (5) reveals that the destination, but not the origin principle, is
compatible with efficient sectoral structures in France and Germany.
The nature of the distortion is illustrated in Figure 1 which uses a diagram familiar in the
foreign trade literature. The concave curve is the German, and the convex the French,
transformation curve between consumption and investment goods. The slopes of the
transformation curves —measuredinversely, from right to left —arethe country specific rates of
'°For other criticisms of the exchange rate argument see Cnossen (1983, p. 240—241). An income
type VAT would allow the deduction of prepaid taxes only on a pro rata basis. See Shoup (1955).7
transformationfrom consumption to investment goods. Under competitive conditions they can be
identified with the producer price ratios P /Pand P /Pthat appear in the formulae.
Efficiency requires, and the destination principle ensures, that the available factors of
production are allocated to the two sectors such that the rates of transformation between
consumption and investment goods are the same in both countries. The two transformation curves
are tangent to one another and the joint production of the two countries is characterized by a
point on the aggregate transformation curve XX.
IC+IF
x
Figure 1: The nature of the deadweight loss under the European VAT and the origin
principle: the cost of non-harTnonization
By way of contrast, the origin principle produces an allocation like that at point Z where,
as shown by (5), the transformation curves intersect. Aggregate output is now indicated by a
point such as A which is on the inferior transformation curve YY rather than on the
technologically feasible curve XX. The German producer price of consumption goods in terms of
investment goods is lower than its French counterpart and, while Germany overspecializes in the
production of consumption goods, France produces too many investment goods. Without the
distortion, it would be possible for the two countries to produce more consumption and more
investment goods without using more factors of production.
In all likelihood, the Europe after 1992 will be subject to the distortions described.
Low—tax countries such as Germany and the U.K. will experience a boom in their consumption




probable revaluation or inflation this boom will generate. Government officials in the low—tax
countries who prefer to wait and see should be aware of these consequences.
Admittedly, there are reasons why the distortions may not be quite as large as they
appear in the model. On the one hand, there are transactions costs that limit the effect of direct
consumer purchases. On the other, firms in high—tax countries can avoid losing customers to the
low—tax countries simply by serving these custuiners via the retail industries in the low—tax
countries, perhaps even without physically shipping any commoditities there. UThefull domestic
VAT accumulated in the product would then be refunded, and only the tax of the low—tax country
would have to be paid. In the extreme case, the high—tax jurisdictions would cease to collect any
revenue and the distortions described would not occur. Transactions costs and political obstacles
of various kinds will, however, prevent this extreme case. Some revenue in the high tax countries
and some welfare loss in terms of a reduced aggregate output will certainly remain. This may calm
the tax collectors, but it does not confirm the optimistic predictions of the Cecchini report that
were cited in the introduction. There is a cost of Europe.
V. An Alternative Method
One way of avoiding the cost of non—harmonized VAT rates would be to replace the invoice
method which the European Commission recommended for border crossing commodity flows with
the subtraction method favored by the German Council of Advisors to the Ministry of Economics.
With the latter, an importing firm would not be able to get a refund for the foreign VAT paid,
but would instead be able to deduct the purchase price from its taxable sales revenue. It is obvious
that this would prevent the revenue loss from tax arbitrage, but, what is more important, it would
also prevent the welfare loss.
The reason for this virtue is that the subtraction method implicitly imposes a tax on the
high—tax country's export of investment goods (or offers a subsidy for the low—tax country's
export of such goods) that just compensates for the effects which the low—tax country's inflation
t1For example, a French firm can deliver a refrigerator it produces to a French customer by first
selling it to a German retailer who then resells it to the French customer, both these transactions
taking place only on paper. This point was also made by Majocchi (1989).
'2See Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundeswirtschaftsministerium (1986) and Boss (1989). For a
discussion of the administrative differences between the invoice and subtraction methods see
McLure (1972).9
or revaluation would otherwise create.'3 To demonstrate the neutrality suppose that, in the model
set up above, a French firm sells an investment good to a German investor at the price
T(1+ r1). The German investor can deduct this price from his taxable sales revenue just as he
can deduct the price P?(l + TG)ofa German investment good, and analogously for a French
investor buying in Germany. In contrast to equation (1), an equilibrium in the investment goods
market therefore requires that
(6) P(1 +TF) =P?(l+.r)
Together with equation (4), which characterizes the equilibrium in the consumption goods market,
this would imply the efficiency condition
(7) P /P=P/P (origin pr., subtraction method).
Obviously, the exchange rate argument would be correct with the subtraction method, but not
with the invoice method.
It seems that the European Commission has made an irrevocable decision against the
subtraction and for the invoice method. Given this decision, only a harmonization of VAT rates
can prevent the distortion.
VI. Direct Taxation: Tax Base bthre Tax Rate Adjustments
As argued above, the residence principle tends to equate interest rates across countries despite
different capital income tax rates, and, under ideal conditions, this implies an efficient
international allocation of capital. One of the ideal conditions necessary for this outcome is that
each country uses the strict Schanz—Eaig—Simons definitions of capital income. Distortions from
accelerated depreciation, non—taxed capital galns, and other divergences from correct accounting
must be excluded.
To illustrate the point, assume that credit contracts are the dominant channel of
international capital movements, that the residence principle applies to the taxation of interest
'The subtraction method is meant to apply exclusively to border crossing commodity flows.
Internal trade continues to be subjected to the invoice method even if part of the value of the
traded commodity was created abroad. For example, if a second firm buys an imported
commodity from a domestic importer, it would be entitled to a credit equal to the product of the
domestic VAT rate and the full price of the commodity. Therehy the neutrality properties of the
method would be preserved even with further trade between firms. For a criticism of the
subtraction method see, however, Andel (1986) and Biehi (1986).10
income, and that, within a country, all kinds of capital income are taxed at a uniform rate.'4 Let
and t be the capital income tax rates of France and Germany in the model set up above and let
and a be the respective national depredation parameters which measure a tax system's
proximity to full expensing. (True economic depreciation corresponds to a =0and expensing, or
immediate write—off, to a =1.)Then French firms invest to the point where their pre—tax return
to capital equals (1 —f ) r,where rt is the French market rate of interest, and analogously
German firms invest until the pre—tax return equals (1 —a)rG.Moreover, because of the
residence principle, there is an international capital market equilibrium where a unique
international interest rate r emerges. The overall condition for an equilibrium in the international
capital market which links the pre—tax returns of the consumption and investment goods sectors
in the two countries is
MPC! P/P1 MPC! pG1pG




will this condition coincide with the efficiency requirement that capital's pre—tax rate of return be
the same in all countries:
(10) MPC P/P' =MPC?P/P ,= i,c
Ingeneral, however, there is a distortion.
The Schanz—Halg—Simons case is== 0.Inthis case, efficiency prevalls despite
diverging tax rates. With other definitions of tax base, efficiency is also possible, but a fine tuning
of the tax rates to compensate for the base divergence would be necessary.
Note that the fine tuning does not mean heading towards equal tax burdens. One of the
sins which politicians regularly commit is to focus on the aggregate tax burden on capital income
alone. Equation (9) reveals that, from an allocative point of view, this is useless and even
misleading. Obviously, a reduction of the tax base, i.e., a higher value of a, calls for a lower,
'4An analysis focussing on the problem on non—uniform taxes can be found in Sinn: (1987,
chapters 7 and 11). For a careful analysis of the tax effects on European direct investment see
Alworth (1987).11
rather than a higher, capital income tax rate. It is one of the fundamentals of a capital market
equilibrium under the residence principle that a policy of a tax—cut—cum—base—broadening cannot
be neutral but is mutually reinforcing and drives capital out of the country.'5
While equation (8) was based on the assumption of uniform national capital income tax
rates, more complicated formulae apply when corporate and personal tax rates are distinguished.
Differences in the cOmpO8itiOn of capital income tax rates can, in principle, add distortions. As a
rule, however, the distortions resulting from non—harmonized rate structures are weaker, the
higher the firms' flexibility in choosing their means of finance. With a high financial flexibility,
non—harmonized rate structures are relatively unimportant since the firms can avoid the sources of
finance against which the tax systems discriminate most. The financial decisions then serve as a
buffer that cushions the real economies against the blows imposed by the tax systems. With
financial flexibility, equation (8) would continue to hold if t. and tG are reinterpreted as corporate
tax rates.
An aspect of the existing capital income tax systems, which for these reasons is far less
important for the allocation of resources than politicians tend to believe, is the degree of
integration of corporate and personal taxation. The frequently blamed double taxation of
corporate dividends imposes a high tax burden on the returns of existing capital, but new capital
which, because of the double taxation, is predominantly financed with debt and retained earnings
is not affected. A European harmonization of the overall tax burdens imposed on dividends may
only generate modest efficiency gains.
If the residence principle is to be maintained and perfected, then the first goal of
harmonization of direct taxation in Europe is to implement the Schanz—Raig—Simons definitions of
capital income and profits, most prominently, true economic depreciation.'6 With true economic
depreciation mere rate differentials do not matter all that much for the allocation of capital and
there is reason enough to hope that this allocation will not diverge greatly from efficiency.
'tSee Sinn (1989).
lsThis confirms the Commission's decision to currently concentrate on the harmonization of
business tax bases. See Kuiper (1988).12
VII. A World with Source Taxation of Capital hwm
One problem with the residence principle is that it does not work well when wealth owners are
dishonest and can more easily conceal their foreign than their domestic interest income. Under
these circumstances a domestic tax on interest income has elements of a source tax and thus tends
to induce capital flight. The recent failure of Germany's experiment with a withholding tax on
interest income —atax that would have been fully credited against the declared interest income —
demonstratesthe dimensions of the problem.17
In order to avoid the problem, strict notification would have to be introduced. Banks
would have to send statements of their customer's interest income to the revenue offices of the
respective countries of residence. A good notification system is not impossible to implement; after
all it exists in the United States. However, in the light of the European bank secrecy laws and the
tax loopholes offered by Luxembourg and Switzerland, it cannot easily be perfected.
A feasible alternative is a system of source taxation. Under the source principle, there is a
tendency to equate the net of tax rather than the gross market rates of interest across the borders.
Let rn be the common international net of tax interest rate. Then, in our two country model, the
French and German interest rates would be linked by the arbitrage condition
(11) r5'(l—tF) =r"=r°(1_t) (source principle)
while the first and the fourth equality signs in (8) would continue to hold. The overall condition
for an international capital market equilibrium that shows how the pre—tax returns to capital of
the four sectors distinguished are interrelated becomes:
MPC p!/pF MPC G1G
(12) ' (i—t1) =r= '
(i—ta),i =I,C(source principle).
ldtFtF laGtG
Obviously, this reduces to the efficiency condition (10) if, and only if,
(13) (1_tp)/(1_uytF) =(1_tQ)/(1_aGtG).
Again, there are many constellations of tax rates and tax base definitions that ensure neutrality.
'7See NOhrbafi and Raab (1989) for an econometric investigation in the effects of the German
source tax.13
However, while under the residence principle true economic depreciation was required to make the
allocation of capital invulnerable to tax rate differences, an immediate write—off is needed when
the source principle applies.'8 With a., == 1,(13) will hold for any tax rates, and (10) results.
Again, tax rate harmonization is not urgent when the tax base is appropriately defined. Again,
base harmonization comes before rate harmonization.
Before the German debacle the European Commission had favored a system of source
taxation and conventional definitions of profits, presumably along the lines of the
Schanz—Haig—Simons concept where a, = 0.It is obvious from (12) that this would have
been a system which would have maximized the vulnerability of the European economy to
international tax rate differences.
Vifi. Tiebout and the Death of the Insurance State
While the previous sections clarified why tax harmonization is needed to avoid distortions, the
problem of how to achieve this harmonization was not addressed. Most European economists seem
to favor a decentralized solution via a competition of tax systems of Tiebout type." This may be
useful for speeding up the process of integration. However, the future scope for efficient tax policy
will be unduly reduced.
The basic lesson from the theory of optimal taxation is that a country cannot, and should
not, impose high taxes on activities whose supply and demand are price elastic. Elastic activities
can escape taxation and thus imply a high excess burden relative to the tax collected. This is
Europe's new problem. The fall of the barriers will increase the possibility of tax avoidance and
provide more elasticity to a number of economic activities. Those who perform these activities will
in future be handled with kid gloves. They will be the winners in an uncoordinated process of tax
harmonization, for they cannot be forced to pay more than simply benefit taxes.
The group of winners will include the mobile part of the labor force and, regardless of
whether the source or the residence principle applies, will also include the owners of capital.
Source taxes are investment taxes that can be avoided by investing abroad. Residence taxes are
"For related discussions of such a system see Sorensen (1988) and Sinn (1987 ch. 11).
"The original article is Tiebout (1956). Recent discussions of the issue which do not, however,
take up the insurance argument put forward in this section, include McLure (1986), Frey (1989),
and Peggy and Richard Musgrave (1989).14
savings taxes which can be avoided by emigration. Admittedly, most savers will not consider such
a radical solution. However, large savers like corporations and rich individuals, will not find it
very difficult to change their country of residence, if only by buying post office boxes in
Liechtenstein.
Consumers will also belong to the winners group. As argued above, they can easily escape
the domestic VAT by buying foreign products or by simply purchasing domestic products via
foreign retailers. The competition of tax systems will exert strong downward pressures on
European VAT rates.2°
The losers of tax competition will be those who cannot escape and those who benefit from
a large government sector. The first group includes immobile workers and landowners. They are
the natural victims of the Tiebout equilibrium, since they will serve as the lenders of last resort to
Europe's impoverished governments. The second group consists of the poor. The poor will lose
because governments will no longer be able to maintain their current scales of redistribution.
On the one hand, for the reasons explained and with the exceptions mentioned, it will be
difficult for a single country to extract the required funds from the rich. On the other hand, net
benefits being given to the poor in one jurisdiction will attract poor people from everywhere and
so make this policy unsustainable. The Ney York city effect will be the death of Europe's welfare
states if the unmitigated competition of tax systems is allowed.
Those who see redistribution policy as the greed of Leviathan, will welcome this outcome.
However, redistrihution is more than that. It can be seen as an efficiency enhancing government
activity which compensates for a lack of risk markets; to a large extent it may simply be insurance
against the risks of lifetime careers. After all, many young people vote left and welcome the
protection of the insurance state, because they do not know how the dice of destiny will fall. It is
true that middle—aged managers who know that the dice have been cast in their favor tend to
object to redistribution. However, this observation is not a good argument against the insurance
interpretation. It may simply indicate a time consistency problem.
Time consistency will be one of Europe's biggest problems when the barriers are down.
Even if all Europeans were equally risk averse and would prefer government redistribution to
laissez—faire, competitive and decentralized governments would not be able to satisfy their needs.
2OThis point was also made by Smith (1989).15
Any country that tries to establish an insurance state would be driven to bankruptcy because it
would face emigration of the lucky who are supposed to give and immigration of the unlucky who
are supposed to receive. Voting with one's feet would only work if it could be limited to the young
and if the middle—aged managers and successful entrepreneurs could be prevented from migrating,
a rather awkward idea. A Europe with competing tax systems and unrestricted migration would
be like an insurance market where the customers can select their company and pay the premium
after they know whether or not a loss has occured.
There are only two options for avoiding this dilemma. One is to introduce binding
redistribution contracts with the government of choice. This would, for example mean that
income taxation is based on a nationality, rather than residence, principle and that only young
people would be allowed to change their nationality. Older people could change their residence,
not their citizenship. The redistributive taxes they pay and the benefits they receive would
continue to be determined by the country they chose when young.
The other, more practicable, option is simply to harmonize tax rates via collective
agreements between the European governments or, more or less equivalently, to allocate all
redistributive activities to a central European government. With a collectively planned
harmonization, rather than one enforced by the competition of tax systems, Europe would not
have to give up its social achievements, and it would not have to suffer the tax—induced
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